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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Gary Leon Chafﬁn,
verdict ﬁnding

him

II,

appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon the jury’s

guilty of forgery.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

Ryan and Natalie Raymond began construction of their Bingham County home

in

March

2017. (Tn, p.421, L.21 — p.422, L.9. 1) In July 2013, they entered into a contract With Gary Chafﬁn,
the

owner 0f Snake River Painting,

prep work.

(T11,

p.422, L.10

Raymonds would pay $3,570

amount

other

payment

the contract, the

p.343, L.19

Raymonds

— p.344, L9;

2017. (Tn, p.348, L.21

1

total for the

to start:

This payment

be bought and stored

When the project

is

also agreed that they

State’s Exhibit 2.)

— p.349,

The

1.)

is

all

necessary

contract provided that the

necessary materials. (State’s Exhibit

for the project. A11 paint will

that is due, in

house and garage, and perform

p.424, L.14; State’s Exhibit

amount due

also provided, in part: “First

paint

—

t0 paint the entire

1.)

The

required to purchase the full

at the proj ect location.

completed.” (State’s Exhibit

would pay for the paint

The Raymonds made

contract

1.)

two

in

the ﬁrst

The only

Prior to signing

installments. (TL,

payment 0n August

5,

L.12; State’s Exhibits 3, 4.)

numbers of the PDF ﬁle “Appeal —
both of the two days of the jury trial, and

Citations t0 pages of the transcript refer to the page

Transcriptspdf.” This

PDF

ﬁle contains transcripts for

the sentencing hearing. These transcripts appear out-of-order in the

sentencing hearing, then jury

trial

day one).

PDF

ﬁle (jury

trial

day two,

The second invoice was generated on August
Exhibit

6.)

The invoice contained a $88

(Tn, p.362, L.25

“price adjustment” based

he was able t0 secure a better price on some of the

The invoice was accompanied by a

11.

paint.

—

p.364, L.4; State’s

on Chafﬁn’s representation

(Tn, p.364, Ls.5-11; State’s Exhibit 6.)

receipt for $3,269.18 of paint purportedly purchased

Stan’s Paint Clinic in Idaho Falls?

that

(Tn, p.364, Ls.12—19; State’s Exhibit 9.)

from

When Chafﬁn

presented this invoice and receipt t0 the Raymonds, he informed them that he had already

purchased the paint depicted in the receipt, and that the paint would be enough to complete the

work 0n the house.

Raymond

stating that

(State’s Exhibit 5.)

7.)

(Tn, p.9, Ls.5-8; p.363, L.25

he had “paid for the paint

The Raymonds paid

Chafﬁn informed

the

Raymonds

— p.364,

L.18.)

Chafﬁn

also sent an email t0 Mr.

at Stan’s to secure the price

and the better paint.”

the second invoice. (TL, p.365, Ls.7-17; State’s Exhibit

that the project

would take approximately two weeks

t0

complete. (TL, p.345, Ls.3-11.)
Shortly after the

work began,

the

progress, inconsistent presence at the job

—

site,

and lack of quality 0fthe prep work.

p.13, L.7; p.67, Ls.15-22; p.344, Ls.20-24; p.439, Ls.12—21.)

subcontractors lined up to do

work who would be delayed should

completed. (Tn, p.452, Ls.9-16.) The

2

Raymonds became concerned about Chafﬁn’s

Chafﬁn

also provided the

after the

p.12, L. 14

The Raymonds had other

the paint project not be timely

Raymonds attempted to speed up the process by performing

Raymonds with

supplies that he purchased for $653.53 0n

Chubbuck, one day

(T11,

lack of

amount of paint and paint
2019 from the Sherwin—Williams store in

a receipt for a smaller

August

Raymonds paid the

6,

ﬁrst invoice. (State’s Exhibit 8.)

some of the prep work themselves (Tr., p.416, L.11 – p.417, L.6), and eventually by bringing in
another painter to assist in the project (Tr., p.392, L.20 – p.393, L.21; p.451, L.20 – p.452, L.19).
Additionally, the Raymonds noticed that only a small amount of paint was present at the
job site, and that no new paint was seen after the second invoice was paid and the accompanying
receipt was provided. (Tr., p.344, L.20 – p.345, L.2; p.429, L.11 – p.430, L.8; p.440, L.24 – p.441,
L.11.) The Raymonds felt this constituted a breach of the contract that required the paint to be
stored on-site. (Tr., p.196, L.25 – p.197, L.3; State’s Exhibit 1.) On August 15, the Raymonds
inquired as to the status of the paint that was depicted in the receipt. (Tr., p.360, Ls.9-20; p.430,
Ls.1-16.) Chaffin responded that the paint was in his truck. (Id.) The next day, the Raymonds
followed up again, and Chaffin informed them that the paint had been transported to BYU-Idaho
in Rexburg for another job, and that he had no money to buy any more paint for the time being.
(Tr., p.430, L.17- p.431, L.17.) In order to continue to attempt to move the project along, Mr.
Raymond accompanied Chaffin on two trips to a local paint store where Mr. Raymond paid for
paint himself. (Tr., p.432, Ls.4-18; State’s Exhibits 11-12.)
By the morning after the second trip to the paint store, Chaffin had removed his supplies
from the job site and ceased work on the project. (Tr., p.376, Ls.8-19; p.432, Ls.19-21.) Even
after this, the Raymonds were still attempting to work with Chaffin. (Tr., p.60, Ls.2-8.) Mr.
Raymond offered to “call it even” with respect to the missing/unpurchased paint if Chaffin paid
back $1,888 and helped the Raymonds’ newly hired painter finish the job. (Tr., p.440, Ls.5-13.)
However, Mr. Raymond and Chaffin eventually agreed to void the contract after Chaffin threatened
to put a lien on the house. (Tr., p.17, Ls.3-12.)

3

On August

18th,

Mr.

Raymond

contacted the sheriff’s department.

(Tn, p.18, Ls.2-17.)

Deputy Jacob Van Orden responded t0 the residence and met with the Raymonds. (Tn,
4.)

After Mr.

Raymond

that the dispute

civil in nature, rather

Raymond

Mr.

17.)

was

described the situation t0 him, Deputy

told

Van Orden explained

Deputy Van Orden

that

The Raymonds then began looking

(Id.)

At

this point, the

into the receipt that

p.140, L.18

—

that the receipt provided

Raymonds contacted

p.141, L.4.)

An

investigation

8,

that

L.3; p.13

1

,

Ls.2-

he

felt

Ls. 14-

— p.129, L3.)
Chafﬁn used

second invoice. (Tn, p.415, Ls.5-19; p.441, L.12 — p.442, L6.) Mrs.

Who responded

1

he wanted Chafﬁn formally trespassed from the

residence so he would not return. (TL, p. 128, L.4

Paint Clinic,

— p. 128,

than criminal. (TL, p. 127, L.9

p.

to

Raymond

accompany

contacted Stan’s

by Chafﬁn was not generated by

the authorities again.

(TL, p. 129, L.17

commenced. (Tn, p.140, L.8 — p.154,

conclusion 0f the investigation, the state charged Chafﬁn With forgery and grand

the

—

the store.

p.13

L.20.)

theft. (R.,

1,

L.2;

At

the

pp.63-

64.)

During the subsequent jury
initially contacting

p.18, L.2

—

trial,

Chafﬁn cross—examined Mr. Raymond 0n

and communicating With the

p.26, L.8; p.52, L.15

—

sheriff” s

p.54, L.6; p.70, L.18

his reasons for

department and Deputy Van Orden. (Tn,

—

p.74, L.13.)

Among

other topics, and

based upon Chafﬁn’s review 0f Deputy Van Orden’s body camera footage} Chafﬁn questioned
Mr.

Raymond on whether he

over the paint project.

3

attempted to utilize Deputy Van Orden to gain leverage in the dispute

(TL, p.22, L.19

—

p.23, L.3; p.53, L.17

—

p.54, L.6.)

On

re-direct, the

The body camera footage was played outside 0f the jury’s presence t0 refresh Mr. Raymonds’
recollection of his conversation with Deputy Van Orden. (Tn, p.27, L.21 — p.52, L5.)

prosecutor asked Mr. Raymond whether, when he talked to Deputy Van Orden, he had any concerns
for the safety of himself or his property. (Tr., p.56, Ls.5-6.) Chaffin objected to the question on
the grounds of relevance and that it was outside the scope of his cross-examination, but the district
court overruled the objection. (Tr., p.56, Ls.7-11.) Raymond then testified that his safety concerns
were a major reason for contacting the police, that he had observed syringes in buckets on the
property, that he was concerned about his children finding the syringes and injuring themselves,
and that he wished to have the syringes disposed of properly. (Tr., p.56, Ls.15-21.)
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Chaffin guilty of forgery, but acquitted him of
grand theft. (R., p.191.) The district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence with three years
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Chaffin on probation for three years. (R., pp.199203.) The court also ordered that Chaffin pay restitution to the Raymonds. (R., pp.211-212.)
Chaffin timely appealed. (R., pp.215-218.)
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ISSUE
Chafﬁn

states the issue

Did

on appeal

the district court err

as:

When

it

allowed Mr.

safety concerns and Mr. Chafﬁn leaving syringes

Raymond t0
at the

testify

Raymonds’

about his
property,

because the testimony was not relevant?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

state rephrases the issue

Has Chafﬁn
t0 testimony about

testimony?

0n appeal

as:

failed to demonstrate that the district court erred

Raymond’s

safety concerns because

by overruling his objection
Chafﬁn opened the door t0 such

ARGUMENT
Chafﬁn Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred BV Overruling Chafﬁn’s
Obiection T0 The Testimony About Raymond’s Safety Concerns Because Chafﬁn Opened The
Door T0 Such Testimony
A.

Introduction

Chafﬁn contends

that the district court erred

re-direct examination questions regarding Mr.

Orden. (Appellant’s

Standard

is

Deputy Van

that this claim fails

Raymond opened the door to such testimony.

a question of law reviewed de novo. State

P.3d 77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011); State

The

for contacting

Of Review

Relevance

C.

Raymond’s reasons

obj ection to the prosecutor’s

However, a review of the record reveals

brief, pp.9-12.)

because Chafﬁn’s cross—examination of Mr.

B.

by overruling his

District

V.

V.

Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254

Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 574, 388 P.3d 583, 588 (2017).

Court Properly Admitted Raymond’s Testimony About His Reasons For

Contacting Deputy Van Orden

T0 be

admissible, evidence must be relevant.

I.R.E. 401, 402.

Evidence that has any

tendency the existence of a fact 0f consequence in the case, and has any tendency to make the
existence of that fact

more probable than

it

would be Without the evidence,

Hooker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810
is

always relevant. State

V.

(Ct.

App. 1989);

I.R.E. 401.

0n

relevant.

State V.

A witness’s credibility

Hairston 133 Idaho 496, 503, 988 P.2d 1170, 1177 (1999); State V.

Osterhoudt 155 Idaho 867, 874, 318 P.3d 636, 643 (Ct. App. 2013).
refute attacks

is

credibility is also relevant.

E

As

a result, evidence used t0

State V. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, 498,

399 P.3d

804, 825 (2017) (“Having opened the door to the subject 0f the veracity of the State’s witnesses,
the defense should not be surprised t0 see the prosecutor enter.” (internal quotations omitted)

(citing

United States

V.

Dorsey, 677 F.3d 944, 954

(9th Cir.

2012).)

In this case, one of Chafﬁn’s primary defense strategies

painting project as civil in nature, and that

was

to portray the dispute over the

Chafﬁn lacked any criminal

L.24 — p.327, L.17 (Chafﬁn’s opening statement).)

intent.

(E

Tr.,

Chafﬁn

In his opening statement,

previewed his subsequent cross—examination of Mr. Raymond regarding Raymond’s
contacting 0f law enforcement.

Chafﬁn suggested

that

Raymond

p.316,

also

initial

contacted the authorities for the

purpose 0f gaining leverage in the dispute, and only after breaching the contract himself by hiring
another painter.

(Tr.,

p.321, L.10

— p.325,

Consistent With this strategy,

L.10.)

Chafﬁn extensively cross—examined Mr. Raymond 0n

his

reasons for contacting law enforcement, and the manner in Which he discussed the issues With

Deputy Van Orden.4 (TL, p.18, L.2 — p.26,
Through

this questioning,

Chafﬁn accused Mr. Raymond

t0 pressure

Chafﬁn

going t0

Chafﬁn come back and

telling

let

to settle the dispute

Deputy Van Orden

actuality, the other painter

4

L.8; p.52, L.15

that

get

— p.54,

of:

L.6; p.70, L.18

left

behind until

Van Orden

this

he had to hire someone else when Chafﬁn

was brought

in before

Chafﬁn

left;

L.13.)

(1) trying to obtain leverage in order

With him; (2) telling Deputy

any property

— p.74,

and

that

he wasn’t

matter was resolved; (3)
left

the project,

(4) requesting that

When

in

Deputy Van

Earlier in the trial, Chafﬁn also cross—examined Mrs. Raymond in a similar manner about Mr.
Raymond’s conversation With Deputy Van Orden. (Tn, p.397, L.1 — p.400, L5.) Mrs. Raymond
was present for that conversation. (Id.)

Orden “scare [Chafﬁn] a

Chafﬁn attempted t0
he was biased in

little” in

attack the credibility of Mr.

initiating

and engaging

Immediately following
direct examination,

order to “[e]nc0urage

him

Raymond’s

t0 settle up.”

trial

in the conversation With

this questioning, the

(Id.)

In other words,

testimony by demonstrating that

Deputy Van Orden.

prosecutor asked Mr.

Raymond,

in his re-

“when you talked to Deputy Van Orden, did you have any concerns

for safety

ofyourself or your property?” (TL, p.56, L.5-6.) Chafﬁn objected t0 the question, “as to relevance

and as

to

beyond the scope of the cross—examination.” (TL, p.56, Ls.9-10.) The

overruled the objection Without further

parties.

(TL, p.56, L.1

comment and Without

district court

requesting argument from the

1.)

Mr. Raymond then answered the question and testiﬁed
0f my major — also major reasons to have [Deputy

that his concern for safety

Van Orden] come

“was one

out.” (TL, p.56, Ls.12-13.)

Mr. Raymond explained:

We felt like anytime, if someone wasn’t there, there could be damage done
We had seen syringes in buckets. We felt the safety for our kids
[sic] because they were on the site all time with us, playing around. We didn’t want

t0 the property.

have them harmed by needles and stuff that were found 0n the property, so
wanted t0 get them disposed 0f properly.
to

(TL, p.56, Ls.16-21.) Mr.

Raymond

additionally testiﬁed that he inquired to

Deputy Van Orden

about obtaining a restraining order against Chafﬁn to keep him away from the property.
Ls.6-1

we

(T12, p.58,

1.)

The

state did

not attempt to introduce this evidence in

Chafﬁn speciﬁcally cross—examined Mr. Raymond on
manner 0f providing information

t0

its

case-in—chief.

However,

his motives in contacting the police

Deputy Van Orden, the

state

was

after

and

entitled t0 explore these

same topics

in

its

re-direct examination

0f Mr. Raymond. Mr. Raymond’s resulting testimony was

thus relevant to rebut Chafﬁn’s challenges t0

Even

then, the prosecutor

The prosecutor did

Raymond.

conversation between Mr.
tell” that

that

was

Raymond’s

credibility.

restrained in eliciting this relevant testimony

not, for example,

elicit

Raymond and Deputy Van Orden

Chafﬁn was “on meth” and was a “major drug

additional related details

-

such as that Mr.

addictg”

and

that

from Mr.
from the

Raymond

“could

Chafﬁn informed him

he was in possession of a handgun. (TL, p.36, Ls.5-6; p.46, Ls.4-14.) The prosecutor instead

only elicited testimony necessary t0 effectively rebut Chafﬁn’s credibility attacks, as he was
entitled t0 d0.

Chafﬁn has

failed t0

show

that the district court erred in overruling his objection to

Raymond’s testimony on re-direct examination regarding his reasons

for contacting the authorities.

This Court must therefore afﬁrm Chafﬁn’s conviction for forgery.

Any Error Was Harmless

D.

Error

may

not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a

substantial right of the party

irregularity or variance

inquiry

is

is

affected

....”

which does not

I.R.E. 103(a).

E

211$ I.C.R. 52

affect substantial rights shall

error, defect,

be disregarded”).

“The

whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational jury would have convicted [the

defendant] even Without the admission of the challenged evidence.” State

664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010) (citing

V.

(“Any

United States, 527 U.S.

1,

Chapman V.

18 (1999)).

10

California,

V.

386 U.S.

Johnson, 148 Idaho

18,

24 (1967); Neder

In this case, even if the district court erred in overruling Chaffin’s objection to the
challenged testimony, any such error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of
Chaffin’s guilt with respect to the charge he was convicted of, forgery, and the relative lack of
prejudice associated with testimony that Raymond saw syringes in buckets around his underconstruction residence.
The jury was instructed that in order to find Chaffin guilty of forgery, it must find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Chaffin, “with the intent to defraud Ryan Raymond,” “falsely made or
forged or attempted to pass as true and genuine a false, altered, forged, or counterfeited writing,
to-wit: a purchase receipt from Stan’s Paint Clinic…knowing that the said receipt was false or
forged.” (R., p.181.) The jury was also instructed that an “intent to defraud” is:
An intent to deceive another person for the purpose of gaining some
material advantage over that person or to induce that person to part with property
or to alter that person’s position to the injury or risk of the person, and to accomplish
that purpose by some false statement, false representation of fact, wrongful
concealment or suppression of truth, or by any other artifice or act designed to
deceive.
(R., p.182.)
The state presented clear and overwhelming evidence that Chaffin committed forgery. To
prove that Chaffin falsely made or forged the receipt accompanying the second invoice, the state
presented extensive testimony from Hutch Gold, the owner of Stan’s Paint Clinic. (Tr., p.75, L.15
– p.98, L.22.) Gold testified that he had not, to his knowledge, ever done business with Chaffin;
that his search for Chaffin and Snake River Painting in the company’s sales records did not reveal
any past purchases; that, upon examination during the trial, the receipt presented by Chaffin was
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not of the type that Stan’s Paint Clinic issues; and that his store did not sell some of the products
depicted on the receipt. (Tr., p.77, L.2 – p.87, L.16.)
The evidence was also overwhelming that Chaffin forged the receipt in order to defraud
and deceive the Raymonds for the purpose of gaining some material advantage, to induce the
Raymonds to part with property, and/or or to alter the Raymonds’ position to the Raymonds’ injury
or risk. No other purpose was evident. The forged receipt did, in fact, induce the second invoice
payment that the Raymonds believed, based on Chaffin’s statements to them, was required to
compensate Chaffin for paint already purchased. (Tr., p.15, Ls.12-19; p.68, Ls.11-16.)
The state also presented testimony from Joseph Denney, the manager of the SherwinWilliams paint store in Chubbuck (Tr., p.103, Ls.5-18), who testified that while his store provided
supplies for the Raymonds’ project, the only paint purchases that were actually made were for a
small amount of paint to cover doors; and two larger purchases that were made by Mr. Raymond
himself (Tr., p.106, L.11 – p.118, L.25). The inescapable inference drawn from the evidence
presented by the state was that Chaffin forged the receipt and falsely represented that he had
already purchased paint for the Raymonds’ project in in order to induce payment for paint that was
never actually purchased. The Raymonds ultimately paid for this paint twice – once when induced
by the false receipt, and again when Mr. Raymond paid for paint himself after Chaffin failed to
produce any.
Additionally, the fact that Raymond was concerned for the safety of his property was
already before the jury prior to the admission of the challenged testimony. In an un-objected to
response to a cross-examination question regarding “how…that meeting [with Deputy Van Orden]

12

came about,” Raymond explained that he “was afraid that [Chaffin] might come back and
vandalize or take other things from the home, so I asked [law enforcement] to keep an eye on the
home and the property at the same time as they were making their rounds.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.2-14.)
The new information provided by Raymond in the subsequent challenged testimony – that he
found syringes in buckets – was not so prejudicial that it could have impacted the jury’s verdict in
light of the evidence of Chaffin’s guilt. While this testimony was relevant to Raymond’s decision
to contact the police, there was no particular evidence connecting Chaffin to the syringe. Further,
there was no evidence expressly referencing any illegal drug use. On re-cross examination,
Chaffin posited an innocent plausible explanation for the syringe, that he was diabetic. (Tr., p.70,
L.18 – p.71, L.12.) Further, as discussed above, while Raymond was concerned enough about the
syringes to contact police, he was not so concerned about the situation that he was unwilling to
continue to attempt to work with Chaffin and obtain his assistance in completing the project.
Raymond’s testimony about the syringes was thus simply not so inflammatory and prejudicial as
to have impacted the jury’s verdict.
Certainly, the testimony about the syringes was not so prejudicial as to prevent a jury
acquittal on the grand theft charge. A rational juror would not acquit on grand theft despite the
admission of this challenged evidence, but convict of forgery because of this same evidence.
Instead, in acquitting Chaffin on the grand theft charge, the jury seemingly accepted Chaffin’s
argument that “the most reasonable explanation” for his actions was that to compensate for a
stunted cash flow, he would “rob Peter to pay Paul,” try to “make it up down [the] line,” and that
the state thus failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Chaffin intended to permanently
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deprive the

that

Raymonds of any property.

Chafﬁn produced the

for short-term gain,

i.e.,

Even assuming

(Tn, p.496, Ls.8-23.) This argument effectively

false receipt for the

committed

assumed

purpose of inducing the Raymonds t0 pay the invoice

forgery.

the district court erred in overruling Chafﬁn’s objection to the challenged

testimony, any such error

was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt,

in light

of the overwhelming

evidence 0f Chafﬁn’s guilt and the relative lack of prejudice associated With the testimony. This

Court should therefore afﬁrm Chafﬁn’s conviction for forgery.

CONCLUSION
The
upon

state respectfully requests that this

the jury verdict

Court afﬁrm the judgment 0f conviction imposed

ﬁnding Chafﬁn guilty of forgery.

DATED this 27th day of November, 2019.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 27th day 0f November, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means
I

of iCourt File and Serve:

BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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